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J.D.
Peter Goodrich∗
Jacques Derrida. J.D. for short. And J.D. of course is titular. It is
J.D.’s monogram, to be sure, but it is equally the acronym for Juris
Doctor. It signifies a lawyer or one wise in the law. If we are to
recollect and celebrate his life in its juridical context and significance
then Jacques Derrida, J.D., is not a bad place to start. Technically, of
course, and despite the legal sounding acronym, J.D. was not a lawyer.
He did, however, hold a visiting appointment at a Law School in New
York. My law school in fact. Let me add, at the risk of getting personal
for a moment—and if not now, when? —that in many ways I am here
because he was. And then also, some of his most influential articles
played with the subject of law or were delivered and published first in a
legal forum: his essay on The Law of Genre,1 or his analysis of Kafka’s
parable Before the Law,2 for example, and then again his lengthy and
widely circulated exposition of The Force of Law.3 He kept coming
back to law: he inhabited its margins, searched for its supplements,
dwelt on its traces.
Looking back, fondly and critically, I think Derrida’s influence on
legal scholarship was significant enough for the acronym J.D. to be
appropriate. He was a lawyer in the classical sense of a scholar who
gave opinions on law, an amicus, a jurisconsultus, or further back still,
in a meaning to be explained later, he was a nomikos or adviser to
lawyers. He was equally, however, a philosopher and critic, a humanist,
a litterateur amongst the lawyers, an outsider looking in and causing a
touch of panic. He looked at positive law from the perspective of a
prior or first law, that of writing or, to quote a phrase, that of “structure,
sign, and play”.4 Such was his gift, his genius and his challenge. He
played with the norm and with the law of genre. To follow that
∗ Professor of Law and Director, Program in Law and Humanities, Cardozo School of Law,
New York. My thanks to Monroe Price, Barbara Vinken, and Cornelia Vismann for comments
and suggestions. Especial thanks to Linda Mills for critical affect and engaging difference.
1 Jacques Derrida, The Law of Genre, 7 GLYPH 55 (Avital Ronell trans., 1980).
2 Jacques Derrida, Préjugés devant la loi, in LA FACULTÉ DE JUGER (J.F. Lyotard et al. eds.,
1985).
3 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 919 (1990) (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
4 JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1978) (1967).
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contribution, both the critical pricks and the public persona, nomos and
mark, it is the law of writing in the writing of law that he called into
question.
SELF-PORTRAIT
Maybe you met Derrida the person. Not that tall, but always
arriving in the company of his aura. Big handshake, generous, warm
greeting, and a tendency to mention his mother. Or you have read
Derrida the book, and on occasion also his handwritten letters and his
postcards. We have learned from his “circumfessions” that his middle
name was Elie, from elu or chosen one.5 We have watched Derrida the
movie and smiled at Jacques on a somewhat unconventional couch and
paradoxically and vehemently denying having ever been in
psychoanalysis himself. We have seen the still life of his face in an
exhibition of the portraits of philosophers. Maybe we visited the park
he helped design in Paris. There was also Derrida the postcard painting,
and the subject of an exhibition by Rebecca Dolinsky. There are even a
few of us who may be hip enough or old enough or neither to remember
also hearing and perhaps dancing to Jacques Derrida the Scritti Politi
single. All of which make Jacques Elie Derrida not a bad turn of
phrase.
There is much that is fond in those avenues of access but they’re
no royal road to the philosopher, the erudite import, the fashion
accessory, the scholarly figure or the disco beat. For those of us
resident to the West of where Jacques mainly wrote, us denizens of the
Anglophone world, before Derrida was Derrida in America, before he
became “French Theory,”6 there was the baroque translation of his most
complex work: Of Grammatology.7 This was his study of the “gramma”
or the accumulations of marks that make up writing systems. It was his
emblematic work, his first American intervention and I will take it for
that reason as my initial theme. I will address J.D.—Jacques Derrida
the mark, the monogram. No helping it, honest reader that I am, I will
elaborate upon what is left, the trace, the gram, in fact the Derrida-gram,
the trajectory of name, nomos, and nomikos.

5 “Circumfession” is the term used in GEOFFREY BENNINGTON & JACQUES DERRIDA,
JACQUES DERRIDA (Geoffrey Bennington trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1993) (1991) to denote
Derrida’s autobiographical subtext.
6 I am borrowing the term from FRANÇOIS CUSSET, FRENCH THEORY: FOUCAULT, DERRIDA,
DELEUZE & CIE ET LES MUTATIONS DE LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE AUX ETATS UNIS (2003).
7 JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns
Hopkins Univ. press 1976) (1967) [hereinafter DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY].
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In truth, I have no choice. It has to be either the mark or its failing
image and materialist that I am, I will start with the obvious. And I also
didn’t meet Jacques that often. It leaves me no option, but to be
economical and scrupulous. I will address the signs that remain, limit
myself, that is, to the graphic traces, pay attention only to the marks or
grams, and most strictly interpreted, where better to start than the nomos
of the name. It was Derrida the metaphor that more than anything else
made us aware of how metaphor invades all of language use. There is a
law of the mark, a sillepsis or slippage of the sign that not even lawyers
can escape. That was at least implicitly his thesis. I will work it out
here, however, by reference to his name. His proper name. His
signature. My method is both simple and radical. I will focus on his
gram in its various forms, as recognized by philologists and
rhetoricians. Here is the list: J.D. the titular monogram, to which I will
now add the pictogram, the logogram, the lipogram, the chronogram,
the anagram, and the nomogram. I confess; I more or less made the last
term up. It is the punch line. You will have to wait. Though not for
long. Just for a gram or two.
GRAMMATOLOGY
A preliminary note: I have started already, am even now underway
with my analysis of the monogram J.D. Had he been here, still here, he
would have liked that. He would have enjoyed the play of the sign and
particularly, the paradoxical plurality of the “mono”gram, of the
singular letters. So much so that after delivering an initial version of
this paper I discovered that I was not alone, that my elaboration of the
monogram was not altogether idiosyncratic. The nominal gram is also
addressed by Derrida’s former student and colleague Jean-Luc Nancy in
an address published in a special issue of L’Herne devoted to Jacques.8
He plays with j.d., italicized lower case, and being French he misses its
legal connotations. He sticks to the ludic and most notably announces
that j.d. sounds like Jedi, the warriors of Star Wars movies—1 to 6 in
all. Then he inverts the monogram to make d.j., Jacques the rock star,
the compère or record player. He arrives eventually at “derridanse” and
“dissemination of jouissance.”
Fanciful outcomes but thin on
elaboration; as fond as they are erudite. They have a dying fall, they
rise and descend, they say adieu in an intimate way, lower case,
affectionate and private in its way. Let them be. My initial point is
rather a philological one. The monogram—from monogrammus—
referred classically to a picture consisting only of lines, a sketch or
8

Jean-Luc Nancy, Le j.d., 83 L’HERNE 53 (2004).
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shadow. It was the archetype of the image, the real portrait in the form
of a vestige and in the secondary meaning listed in Lewis and Short, it
refers to a skeleton.9 Address the monogram and you are immediately
engaged with the skeleton—the structure, the key, the remains. Which
seems peculiarly apposite. On the money. We are here, participants,
writers, readers—are we not?—to address the vestiges, to clothe the
skeleton with our memories and hopes.
So next, the pictogram. My favorite instance comes from a paper
delivered by Roman Jakobson’s collaborator Louis Halle. He took an
early manuscript of the 23rd Psalm and showed that if you turned the
psalm on its side, it made a castle. He claimed that this provided a
hermeneutic key to the poem: it was a defensive exercise, an apology
and so on. Quite right too, and very persuasive. But what about
Derrida’s name? I have put it sideways, upside down, diagonal and
more, and at first, I confess, it didn’t seem to illustrate very much. Not
a promising start, but wait, just look at the name in ordinary cursive (or
in some other font, French Script MT maybe, or even better in
Blackadder) and in time, depending on your font, you will see the
outline of a ship. A firm initial capital “D,” the perilunar flourish forms
a vigorous rudder, “D” the gubernator. The second “d,” in lower case, a
funnel or a mast—depending upon your sailing prowess. The final “a”
with its forward curlicue makes a prow, a fine Norse nose cutting
through the waters on the way to new worlds. And what are we to make
of such a pictogram, Derrida the ship? It is I think an appropriate image
of a heterotopic space, the sign of a moving mark, a floating signifier.
Hermeneutically that is apt, it marks as it must Derrida the friend, the
ship who passes in the night, and Derrida the courier or messenger, the
advocate of deconstruction, alone and passing through. Europe in
America, doing the continental.
That takes us nicely to the logogram, to the philology and
etymology of the proper noun. In the old legal jargon, in a Latin gloss
to the Corpus Iuris, we learn that the name inheres in the bones—
nomina ossibus inhaerent—and this must be taken to mean that the
name is its own law, the name as nomos appropriates the person, and it
is the name that, to borrow from Baldus, makes the body walk. And so,
in the mode of a dictionary entry:
Derrida, Jacques (pronunciation: da reader) (employment itinerant:
Paris, New York, Irvine). The name is first off and most obviously
from the Latin derideo, to scoff at, to deride. This is not an obvious
root. It should thus be noted that derideo has a stronger meaning
than in English and implies that the person deriding has an advantage
enabling him to do so with reason: thus to ridicule. Etymologically
9 A LATIN DICTIONARY FOUNDED ON ANDREW’S EDITION OF FREUND’S LATIN
DICTIONARY (Charlton T. Lewis & Charles Short eds., 1962).
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at least, Derrida derided for good causes, he was a scholar, an erudite
practitioner of the supplementary interpretation, an irreverent
philosopher who allowed words to have their say. Take the play on
the name a little further, and we can note that in Medieval Latin,
Derrida can be given a root in rida meaning ridge. There is a further
cognate meaning associated with ad deridicula or to extremes, all the
way to the ridge, to the limit as it were. And finally, as another
supplement, there is an alternate etymology from the Old English
ridere, from ridan to ride, which is the occupational name of a
messenger.
Derrida is here again and variously the mercurial hermeneut, the
semionaut perhaps of relational aesthetics,10 the itinerant figure of
passage, of transmission of meaning. He is not, however, your usual
messenger, his hermeneutics are in conventional terms on the margin
or more simply they are extreme. His play upon interpretation, the
elements of deconstruction and supplement, the philological ploys all
make for an honesty, a candid refusal to reduce, that was early on
interpreted to be somewhat mocking of accepted norms of academic
discourse, a little critical of the self-possession, propriety and amour
propre of scholars. Derrida was always most generous to words. He
would play, mock, ride the ridge, push to extremes and, peculiarly
troubling for law, offer a Janus face, a double reading. So his name
is not far from his nomos, his logogram is close to the mark. If one
sought a figure that captured this naming, then my choice would be
epimone also termed in Latin versus intercalaris. This figure refers
to a verse that is inserted several times in a poem and carries—bears
the burden of—its meaning. In Puttenham’s definition, the figure of
epimone originally had a musical context and so suggests something
of the lyrical and rhythmic, a submerged beat, a refrain. Puttenham
gives an example from Sir Philip Sidney: “My true lo[v]e hath my
heart and I ha[v]e his,” repeated three times in a poem to
friendship.11 And already, in 1589, in a rhetorical treatise written by
a lawyer, we can hear the resonances of Derrida’s much later work,
the early intimations one might surmise of Politics of Friendship.12

Puttenham’s example is a good one. Derrida was all out for
friendship and the epimone that his name suggests can be found most
explicitly in his book on friendship which has as its versus intercalaris,
the Aristotelian phrase, “O my friends, there is no friend.”13 For
Derrida, I suspect, there was no friend because the singular and unique
relationship of amity or amorousness necessarily escaped the
abstraction of friendship, the public token of amity in the market.
10
11
12

As per NICOLAS BOURRIAUD, RELATIONAL AESTHETICS 113 (2002).
GEORGE PUTTENHAM, THE ARTE OF ENGLISH POESIE 225 (1936).
JACQUES DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP (George Collins trans., Verso 1997) (1994)
[hereinafter DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP].
13 Id. at 1.
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Derrida, who always and vehemently resisted being in analysis, treated
amity as far more than could be said or numbered and named.
Friendship occupied a space of silence and the decipherment of its
intimations. Everything, and here I will use his own words from an
interview after the death of Althusser, “everything took place
underground, in the said of the unsaid.”14 Hence in a sense to the
intercalated phrase: there is no friend, only the becoming of friendship,
the struggle towards friendship, the failed attempt at the self-presence of
friends, to use Derrida’s own early terminology. In sum, friendship has
its own law. That is what Jacques kept saying, what he repeated in his
many different ways.
From logogram to lipogram. The third category of gram, the
lipogram, refers to a type of witticism, the classical device of dropping a
letter from a word or, as in the case of Tryphiodorus, from an entire
Odyssey or epic poem. Addison, the Augustan satirist, whose essay on
wit is a principal source on this practice,15 cites Seneca on the
lipogrammatists: “[o]perose nihil agunt” (busy about nothing) and so
indeed it is fortunate that Derrida never resorted to any simple lipogram,
but he did famously drop an “e” and substitute an “a,” changing
“difference” to “difference.”16 We can note that the substitution is
recognized by Addison as a subtype of lipogram and as a more or less
legitimate mode of witty argument. Addison gives the example of
Cicero. The name comes from cicer meaning a wen or little morbid
lump, a vetch no less. He then recounts that Cicero ordered the words
“Marcus Tullius,” with the figure of a vetch at the end of them, be
inscribed on a public monument. “This was done probably to show that
he was neither ashamed of his name or family.”17 In Derrida’s case the
lipogram différance is used in the argument that writing is presupposed
in speech, that speech carries the trace of the written in a phonetically
indiscernible manner. There is much more to the argument in that the
very possibility of this substitution marks a linguistic impossibility, a
play or slippage of meaning that precludes any definitive origin or
meaning to words and laws. Without expanding on the philosophical
significance of the lipogram, we can simply note that it is a gram, and in
fact, it is one of Derrida’s more famous grams, a repeated term, and
maybe even another epimone.

14 JACQUES DERRIDA, NEGOTIATIONS: INTERVENTIONS AND INTERVIEWS, 1971-2001, at 158
(Elizabeth Rottenberg ed. & trans., 2002) [hereinafter DERRIDA, NEGOTIATIONS].
15 Joseph Addison, Essay on Wit – History of False Wit, reprinted in THE BRITISH
ESSAYISTS: WITH PREFACES, HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL 382 (A. Chalmers ed., Boston,
Little, Brown and Co. 1855) (1711).
16 DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 7, at 9.
17 Addison, supra note 15, at 384.
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Fourth is the chronogram. Perhaps the most obscure and
significant of the diverse grams.18 The chronogram is the number made
up from the letters in the name that are also Roman numerals. We can
link it to the lipogram. Here is how it works. The chronogram reads
those letters in a name that are also Roman numerals, and
lipogrammatically drops the rest. The numerals in the name are then
added up to form a number, the chronogram, a species of paronomasia
or renaming. Not only is the chronogram a species of lipogrammatic
substitution, it also shows the power of the concept of différance which
argues that all meaning is potentially undecideable, that all words are
codes or metaphors requiring the justice of interpretation. Choices have
to be made, prejudices and precedents suspended, while the words are
attended to, letters substituted, corruptions reformed perhaps, and
meanings put into play. That is the project that the court of literature
imposes upon the practices of law. In this case the issue is the
numerical value, the numerological significance, of Jacques Elie
Derrida.
Add it up and we can truthfully say that we have Derrida’s number.
Here it is: CLIDID—100, 50, 1, 500, 1, 500. It comes to 1152 if one
counts each Roman numeral separately. Added simply as Arabic
numbers the total is 18. As neither of those totals is exactly the
meaning we need, it is necessary to use a lipogram as well. I will come
to that shortly. First off, 1152 is not an insignificant date. Given time I
could find many meanings for it. Without too much effort, we can place
1152 at the cusp that marks the transition from the late Middle Ages to
the Renaissance. It is the era of the troubadour lyric and the reception
of Ovid’s Art of Love. The comedy of eros was rampant, the laws of
love were being formulated and promulgated, the flowers of rhetoric
were being sown and we might hazard that philosophy would later and
ambivalently watch them bloom. Put it differently, “differently” even,
the first postclassical—cisalpine—postcards were being sent, the love
notes of the courtly lyric, the first laws of the gay grammar, not Socrates
to Freud so much as A.D. to J.D., Arnaut Daniel to Jacques Derrida and
beyond: “I am Jacques, who hoards the wind / And hunts the hare with
an ox.”19 It is J.D. as J.T. or juridical troubadour sending his latter day
billets doux, his postcards.
It is the period of poetic searching, of the gay science, of las leys
d’amor or of the cases, judgments and laws of love. For the
18 For the sake of completeness, I will note, however, that I am not alone in adducing a
Derridean chronogram. HÉLÈNE CIXOUS, PORTRAIT OF JACQUES DERRIDA AS A YOUNG JEWISH
SAINT 13 (Beverley Bie Brahic trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2004) derives a chronogram from
Derrida’s middle name Elie which signals LI or in Arabic numerals 51.
19 I am adapting one of Arnaut Daniel’s most famous verses. THE POETRY OF ARNAUT
DANIEL xiv (James Wilhelm, ed. & trans., 1981). For discussion see JULIA KRISTEVA, TALES OF
LOVE 282-87 (Leon S. Roudiez trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1987) (1983).
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troubadours, court and law were everything, ethics ruled, and amor
vincit omnia, as the poet legislators, Vergil in particular, used to say.
The point is that in 1152, our arbitrary date, and assuming even that the
12th century took place, law was really very much closer to what J.D.
would likely propose, than to what positivists now mean by it. For the
judges of the courtly lyric and of the legally disputed question of love,
the quaestio amoris, the rule to be applied was that of rhetoric, both law
and word, rectorica as it was later termed, and mezura, meaning
measure and ethical honesty was the sign of the times rather than any
more positive rule. It was also an epoch of transition in the uses of
writing and law. Writing was just coming in as a trustworthy mnemonic
in legal affairs. And then again, it was one of the many years that
Aelred of Rievaulx, having made a start but being now taken up with
his responsibilities as Abbot, postponed work on his treatise On
Spiritual Friendship. So a lot going on. The transitional status of
writing, the movement from unwritten to written forms of record, and
specifically the indiscernible border between them is both an emblem of
that epoch and an important grammatological theme. An intimate date.
A hidden source perhaps, a precursor and exemplum for Jacques’s
work.
This prior law, rectorica, gains its strongest expression, its
exemplary development in The Postcard, the book of envois of the late
1970s. We are told, recollect if you will, that this work “might [be] read
. . . as the preface to a book that I have not written.”20 It is a declaration
of a prior law, an amour lointain, distant love in its courtly or proper
form and sure enough his letters come predicated upon the conditional,
and they say, 3rd of June 1977: “and when I call you my love, my love,
is it you I am calling or my love?,” all the way to 30 August 1979:
“Tomorrow I will write you again, in our foreign language. I won’t
retain a word of it and in September, without my even having seen you
again, you will burn / you will burn it, you, it has to be you.”21 The
troubadour, in other words, the archetype and practitioner of amor de
lon, avoids the proper name, defers meeting, and worships an absent
ideal, an impossible presence. The courtly lyric that Jacques takes up,
in his way, demands an indirection of correspondence, it inscribes in its
very indefinition the potential failure of all communication, it defers
presence and self to geography and political circumstance. The
postcards seem always also not to arrive, not to have any determinate
recipient, and so embody a typical destinerrance: “In history, this is my

20 JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POSTCARD: FROM SOCRATES TO FREUD AND BEYOND 3 (Alan
Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1987) (1980).
21 Id. at 8, 256.
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hypothesis, epistolary fictions multiply [with the advent of each] new
crisis of destination . . . .”22
And 20 years later, because I am nothing if not persistent in my
reading, and this is my point, in his text on friendship, on the laws of
amity, he repeats this same structure. All this time on, now even more
explicitly, he still appeals to a structure of innomination, an unnameable
desire, a before of law that is more powerful and binds more tightly than
law itself. His work thus explicitly addresses an undeclared or covert
love, a space where “[w]ithout seeking to conceal it, it will have been
understood that I wish to speak here of those men and women to whom
a bond of friendship unites me—that is, I also want to speak to them.”23
But only in the future anterior, with unconcealed concealment, with all
the longing and aspiration that comes from traversal of a great distance,
the long distance that constitutes the space of rumor and of what J.D.
elsewhere calls the “said of the unsaid.”24 And the unsaid takes us back
to the atemporal time of humanism, the indeterminate temporality of a
sublimated desire: “Friendship, what is proper or essential to friendship
can be thought and lived without the least reference to the be-loved.”25
Which expression of desire could just as easily come from Bernard de
Ventadorn or any other of the twelfth century heroes of an exquisitely
impossible desire.
Enough of the date. Add to that the number 18, the age of
majority, birth as a symbolic subject, entry into legal subjectivity, the
permutation into reason, and we hardly need the chronographic
lipogram. It is hardly worth dropping the second D, the latter 5 so as to
turn 18 into 13. But I will anyway and in honor of Derrida’s Jewish
roots. Thirteen is the age of maturity for males in the Judaic tradition.
We can add to that the observation that according to the Torah there are
13 divine attributes, and 613 commandments. Thirteen is a wonderfully
ambiguous sign, it is constantly at play, lucky and unlucky, powerful
and portentous. I, for instance, was born on the 13th of the month,
September 13th 1954 to be exact, and have always favored 13 as a sign
of good luck. This essay was 13 pages long at proofing, strange
coincidence, typesetter please note.
Or, further example, the
Roundhead Oliver Cromwell, leader of England’s short-lived
revolution, was born and died on September 13th. We could add,
though this is cream on cream, ad derridicula as it were, that 13 was
classically a sign of power and that Zeus sat as the 13th and most
powerful God. In Tarot, the 13th major arcanum is Death meaning not
ending but fresh beginning. So 13 is kind of the numerical equivalent
22
23
24
25

Id. at 232 (translation modified).
DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP, supra note 12, at 302.
DERRIDA, NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 14, at 158.
DERRIDA, POLITICS OF FRIENDSHIP, supra note 12, at 9.
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of différance, and it too can be taken to mark an impossible space or
fractured origin. And that is appropriate, granted that both the number
and the concept are the products of lipograms, and both signify a
peculiarly Derridean hermeneutic play.
THE NOMOGRAM
That takes us to the anagram. We have already noted the J.D. in
Jacques Derrida. One could note, just for additional support, though it
is quite unnecessary, just a flourish, that inside the name one can find ad
iure or towards law, as well as ludic, seria and deja lu. We could even
go further and deploy the Renaissance theory of the anagram which
took the English name and fashioned a Latin maxim from the letters.
More than that, it was not an exact science and so letters could be added
or dropped so as to make the motto that fitted best. It was necessary
only that the root or bulk of the letters were from the name. That was
all and there was certainly no harm in a lipogram or two in aid of a
choice anagram. By this method we can embellish Jacques Elie Derrida
into ius scribendi judaica—author of a Jewish law—and so lend support
for Helene C.’s theory of J.D. as a Jewish saint. But I prefer studia, alia
ius cura—literature bringing charity to law. That was Jacques through
and through and there it is again, encoded in his very name.
But J.D. says it as well and more succinctly. It is that juristic
theme that will be traced into the final gram, the nomogram. The term
is not mine, but rather borrowed from the oeuvre of a colleague of
Derrida’s, Pierre Legendre, whose work on writing and law addresses in
a specifically legal context some of the themes, especially those of
scribble, of writing and power, that Derrida played upon in more literary
terms.26 Whatever the source, and Legendre hardly develops the term,
the nomogram is a neologism coined from nomos and gramma, a
combination that joins order or measure to mark, trace, or sign. We
might translate it as the law of the sign or more specifically as the rule
or institutional significance of the name. Derrida then or as I have
suggested J.D. stands for something, it appropriates or names a person,
an institution, a measure.
Derrida stood back. He acknowledged in a rather surprising
interview that he gave after the death of Louis Althusser that he didn’t
26 Jacques Derrida, Scribble (Writing–Power), 58 YALE FRENCH STUDIES 117 (Cary Plotkin
trans., 1979). The nomogram is defined first in PIERRE LEGENDRE, LES ENFANTS DU TEXTE:
ÉTUDE SUR LA FUNCTION PARENTAL DES ÉTATS 60-63 (1992), and is reprised in PIERRE
LEGENDRE, LA 901ÈME CONCLUSION: ÉTUDE SUR LE THÉÂTRE DE LA RAISON 67 (1998). See
further, PIERRE LEGENDRE, DE LA SOCIÉTÉ COMME TEXTE: LINÉAMENTS D’UNE
ANTHROPOLOGIE DOGMATIQUE 220 (2001).
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write very well, indeed that he wrote in a complex and convoluted style,
“almost to the point of unintelligibility.”27 That is a surprising
admission from a philosopher, but also touchingly direct in its
momentary and seemingly unconscious self-exposure.
But he
immediately went on to explain that he had his reasons for this
unintelligible style. It was his way of protecting himself, his manner of
showing respect to the political order at the Ecole Normale when he
arrived there young, uncertain and from Algeria. He didn’t want to
upset Louis Althusser, the philosopher prince, nor did he wish to be
denounced or derided by Althusser’s acolytes as a reactionary thinker, a
phenomenologist who prioritized subjectivity over politics, philosophy
over social change. Those were the terms of the discourse when he
arrived in the academy and they marked his work, they gave his
writings their nomos, that of suspension and of prior judgment, a certain
ethics of indirection, of aporia and of waiting.
If Louis Althusser was the legislator of the intellectual norm, the
promulgator of bad style, his fault was, in Jacques’s analysis, that of
adopting or at least allowing himself to be placed in the position of
sovereignty. He and his followers enforced a code; they instituted a
norm, and were even, in Jacques’s view, somewhat terroristic in their
impositions and their judgments. Derrida sought to move beyond that
degree of determination, or in Althusserian terms, the overdetermination
of the real. He sought to avoid legislating and, being by training a
phenomenologist, he wanted to attend to the question of origin, the
question of what comes prior to judgment and law. His fascination with
law was in consequence no accident. Whether because of personal
experience or for institutional reasons, and specifically so as to overturn
the structuralist orthodoxy that he encountered professionally, the
question of law was persistently present.
The discipline of law represented for Jacques a protocol of close
reading. He spent time with lawyers because they were to his mind
unsung grammatologists, latter day hermeneuts, the disciplinary
inheritors of a tradition within which words really mattered. Lawyers,
and specifically legal scholars, with their texts, their cases, their briefs,
their files, and their diktats. Their discipline cried out for the
application of a rigorous hermeneutics, for some flexibility and play in
interpretation. They could use a little phenomenology and that is what
Derrida gave. That was his gift. He addressed the force of law in terms
of its illocutionary force, its modes of enunciation, its utterance and
reiteration. His concern, his obsession if you like, was with the
institutional site of legal discourse and specifically with the ground of
its judgments. He wanted to look philosophically at the moment prior
27
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to judgment, pre-law, or Kafka’s Before the Law,28 as a way of holding
up on legislating too quickly or determining on the basis of prejudice—
prior judgment—alone. Step back from the law and you are in the
territory of the nomos or rule of pre-law.
Nomos is derived from the verb nemein meaning to appropriate and
by extension to name. What did Derrida name? More precisely, what
did he appropriate, measure, make his own? The trajectory I have
traced through his name, his own gram, is one that moves from gay
science to law, from postcards to legal texts, from justice to judgment.
There is first the attention to play, and specifically the play of words. In
his book The Post Card, Derrida plays upon the desire that subtends
writing. He sends postcards and love letters as a species of literary
acrostic that marks how every text is a fragment and exemplifies the
hermeneutic necessity of attending to the lyrical and lexical, the
unintended or marginal features of writing. His position was very
consistent. The troubadour, the poet lawyer, the scholar who attends to
the measure that underpins law, is a distant lover, an infinitely patient
reader, and attentive to every detail, to every syllable, sound and letter.
Thus his injunction to his correspondents: listen. The protocol of
listening is attention, waiting, doubting, holding on. Suspend the rush
to judgment, do not be determined to decide, don’t decide in advance.
Good readers are not afraid to retrace their path nor hesitant to examine
how they came to be where they now are.
Lawyers decide. They judge, they determine, they legislate. There
is no avoiding legal writs, the statutes, injunctions, subpoenas. No
question about that. Good or bad, it gets done. Derrida’s question was
slightly to the side of that manifest determination. He asked, what
comes before the law? What precedes the rush to judgment? How do
we understand law in terms of whence it came? In his essay on the
force of law, Derrida held up the institutional site of legal judgment to
scrutiny. He argued that before law there has to be a moment of
suspension, an instance of inattention to law, a hearing of the particular,
person and event, prior to rule or determination. Justice meant holding
back from calculus and judgment. The instant precedes the rule. It was
an argument made in a legal forum and with reference to the Levinasian
concept of the face to face of justice, the call of the other. I will end by
suggesting that in fact, the legitimate force of law is for Derrida both
richer and more complicated than his initial take in that essay suggests.
The clue lies in the epimone. For law to be just, the judge has to
enter a relation with the judged. The subject of judgment has to be seen
and heard. That is axiomatic. The judge has to listen and remind the
judged that law is something held in common. Justice says, in effect,
28 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL, at ch. 1 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., Alfred A. Knopf ed.
1986) (1937).
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“Oh my friends, there is no friend.” A curious reprise, a strange if
implicit judicial utterance. But Derrida was very much about the
implicit in the legal and about the attitude or tone that came prior to law.
For him friendship preceded law, it was the implicit relationship, the
moment of amity being the expression of justice in the intimate space in
which law was suspended. The judge cannot be a friend, there is no
friend, but the judge exists amicably, in a loving relationship, amongst
friends. Law will turn the singular into the general, the particular into
the abstract, instance to rule. That is what law does, but before it does it
there is a moment of amity, an attention to friendship, to things held in
common. It is a position that has its origins in Aristotle’s Ethics, of
course, and in the aphoristic dictum that “good legislators pay more
attention to friendship than to law,” but Derrida’s genius was to take
that principle seriously, to play with it, to apply it directly to the
legislations of lawyers.
Friendship, living together, holding things in common, inhabiting
the same institution, these are the pre-conditions of law. Amity is
nomos. Amity is more important than law because it is amity that
grounds law and makes justice possible. That is Derrida’s main
argument, his nomogram, his measure of law. He was in that sense a
nomikos, a term that appears in a few post-classical manuscripts and
that means someone who is not a lawyer but one who advises lawyers,
and specifically judges, on the meaning of law. Derrida. Nomikos. J.D.
deserved his J.D. There is a black and white photograph in our law
school faculty seminar room.
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It shows Jacques at the 1990 Conference on his work, on
“deconstruction and the possibility of justice,” at Cardozo School of
Law School in New York. He is sitting and listening. Big hair. White as
snow. He is leaning back, face turned, with a hand on his cheek. He
looks younger then, but also tired, supporting his face with his hand,
maybe hiding the blind side, the bad side. Whatever the tenor or pitch
of the head, his gaze is generous, deep, and attentive. He looks
infinitely patient. He is attending the conference. He is waiting,
waiting and listening to the lawyers talk as lawyers will. There is
distance, time, stillness and a certain melancholy, a composed
strangeness as well as an exceptional amicability in the portrait. He is
not one of them, the eyes seem to say, but he is amongst them. Oh my
friends, there is no friend. That is the lyrical and always potentially
ludic position that his posture conveys. It is an image of intimacy, hung
in a public place. A gesture of love in a professional domain. The
photo remains. It hangs over the Law School. It shows Derrida from
the inside, looking out. It offers a lesson for lawyers. Derrida the
nomikos. J.D in the process of getting his J.D. Or put it like this. He
sent a nomogram. A postcard image. He was amicus curiae, a friendly
critic of law.

